Why ties with Türkiye matter in the evolution of PM Sanae Takaichi’s ‘new’ Japan

Sanae Takaichi, a 64-year-old conservative member of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), became the country’s first female prime minister this October, winning a parliamentary vote and succeeding in her third bid for the party leadership.

A protege of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, Takaichi has pledged to revive his “Abenomics” strategy, which combines high public spending with loose monetary policy. 

Takaichi’s term in office provides an opportunity for Türkiye and Japan to revive a partnership that never fully materialised during the Abe era.

Japan’s expanding defence capabilities and relaxed export controls are well-aligned with Türkiye's rapidly growing defence industry, creating opportunities for joint development and enhancing the strategic autonomy of both countries. 

Energy security is another area of convergence. Türkiye's role as a regional energy hub and Japan's commitment to maintaining diverse energy sources, including Russian LNG, could lead to a structured dialogue that influences Eurasian energy politics.

Supply-chain resilience, particularly through the Middle Corridor connecting Türkiye to East Asia, complements Japan’s efforts to secure critical minerals and reduce dependence on China, providing a foundation for collaborative infrastructure and connectivity projects across Central Asia.

In diplomatic terms, both Takaichi and Erdogan navigate volatile great-power politics with a similar degree of strategic flexibility, positioning their countries as agile middle powers capable of bridging regions and mediating competing interests. 

If both governments seize this opportunity, a renewed Türkiye–Japan partnership could extend its influence from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific, becoming a defining feature of the next era of middle powers.

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Domestic politics and Sanae Takaichi

Born and raised in Nara to non-political parents, Takaichi had an unconventional early life, working as a heavy metal drummer, TV host, scuba diver and car enthusiast. Her old Toyota Supra now sits in a local museum. 

It was during her work for US Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder in the 1980s, amid tense US–Japan trade disputes, that her interest in politics began to emerge. 

This experience convinced her that Japan needed the ability to defend itself rather than rely on US opinion. 

First elected to parliament in 1993, she joined the LDP in 1996 and became one of its most vocal conservatives. 

She served in senior roles, including as minister for economic security, trade, and industry, and internal affairs and communications. 

Following unsuccessful leadership bids in 2021 and 2024, she won in 2025. On the campaign trail, she told schoolchildren that she aspired to be Japan’s ‘Iron Lady’ in the mould of Britain’s Margaret Thatcher.

She is a firm social conservative who opposes married women keeping their maiden names and rejects same-sex marriage. 

She has moved towards a more gender-oriented stance, attempting to address these issues by proposing tax breaks for childcare, supporting babysitting services and improving care services for women and the elderly. 

These proposals are informed by her experience of caring for family members.

She took office at a time when the LDP was facing scandals, economic stagnation, demographic decline and competition from the rapidly growing far-right Sanseito party. 

Having lost its majority in both houses and facing internal criticism, the LDP now needs to win back voters and reposition itself as the defender of Japan’s national interests. 

Takaichi insists that “the LDP must change for the sake of Japan’s present and future” and explicitly sees herself as the political and ideological heir of Shinzo Abe (1954–2022), having signalled her intention to succeed him. 

Takaichi moved forward with her assertive foreign policy agenda of strengthened security partnerships, increased defence spending, and a more active role for Japan’s Self-Defence Forces. 

The policies that Abe normalised, particularly concerning Japan’s role in the strategic architecture of the Indo-Pacific region, now form the basis of Takaichi’s thinking rather than setting its boundaries. 

This continuity emerges at a time when Japan is facing both external threats and internal political realignment.

The sudden pull-out of the Komeito party from its 26-year coalition with the LDP was a reflection of its discomfort with Takaichi's hawkish agenda and her deviation from traditional pacifism. 

To overcome her minority position, Takaichi formed a new coalition with the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), whose priorities of administrative reform, decentralisation, stronger defence forces and constitutional revision closely align with her own. 

This partnership removes the foreign and security policy constraints that Komeito once imposed, giving an LDP–Ishin government far more room to adopt a bolder international stance and enabling Takaichi to advance policies that were previously difficult to implement.

A nation in flux

Generational change in Japan is altering the electorate’s views. Younger voters, who have no memory of World War II, view China’s rise, North Korea’s missile programme and the instability of global norms as threats. 

They are becoming more accepting of the idea of a stronger Japanese military. In this climate, Takaichi’s assertiveness is not an outlier in politics, but rather a reflection of the new social reality. 

The appointment of Shinjiro Koizumi as Defence Minister demonstrates a carefully balanced approach in this condition. Koizumi is a conservative with broad appeal, an ideal choice for a government aiming to assertively advance defence policy.

Takaichi's international appearances have been more revealing than her domestic appointments. 

Her meeting with US President Donald Trump in Tokyo was a lesson in deliberate symbolism. 

Following in Abe’s footsteps, she created an environment designed to appeal to Trump personally. 

She lit up the Tokyo Tower and the SkyTree in the colours of the American flag, arranged for Trump’s preferred interpreter, and presented him with a golden golf ball alongside Abe’s putting club. 

Trump and Takaichi clearly hit it off, sharing displays of personal warmth and walking arm in arm to project an image of mutual rapport. 

Their joint ride on Marine One and public appearance aboard the USS George Washington further reinforced the narrative of their seamless partnership.

Although Takaichi used symbolism to win over Trump, she did not compromise on substantive issues. 

She avoided the concessions that critics had feared and did not alter existing trade terms. Instead, she managed to shape the bilateral agenda around agreements that were already in line with Japanese policy. 

This included a commitment to strengthening the supply chain for critical minerals. She also withstood Trump’s pressure to halt imports of Russian LNG, explaining that Japan relies on Russian supplies for nine percent of its needs, and outlining the implications for Japanese companies involved in the Sakhalin-2 project. 

It signalled that her diplomatic charm does not equate to strategic submission; rather, she aspires to be a “Japan first, but not Japan alone” leader.

This stance is reminiscent of Abe’s strategic approach of working closely with Washington while preserving Japan’s autonomy. 

However, Takaichi is governing in a different world. With the US under the Trump presidency once again favouring a transactional approach and China becoming more assertive in regional waters, Japan’s need for diversified partnerships is greater than ever.

Compared to the Abe era, China is now far more assertive and powerful. This power is in a more sensitive position than before. 

Indeed, Takaichi stated in the Japanese parliament this month that a Chinese military attack on Taiwan could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" and might force Japan to take military action to exercise "collective self-defence".  

Following this statement and the strong reactions it triggered, China also activated its economic and diplomatic coercion mechanisms. 

Takaichi’s opening weeks in office demonstrate her understanding that personal diplomacy with Trump is essential for the alliance, but that maintaining space for Japan’s independent interests is equally necessary. 

It is in this political balancing act that her foreign-policy philosophy, inherited from Abe yet shaped by new constraints, is most evident.

Emerging strategic landscape between middle-powers

The strategic environment into which Takaichi is stepping is characterised by fragmentation and volatility, multiple crises, and the re-emergence of middle-powers as decisive actors. 

The world described by Abe, one in which the US was a stable anchor, Chinese power was rising predictably, and middle-powers could rely on a rules-based order, has shifted dramatically. 

Today, the US-China rivalry is just one axis of tension among many. 

Energy insecurity, the war in Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, uncertainty in global supply chains and the erosion of multilateral institutions have created a system in which states capable of flexible, multiplex and multi-directional diplomacy are increasingly shaping outcomes.

Türkiye, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil are establishing themselves as key providers of stability and facilitators of regional connections. 

They are also status seekers and developers of new economic and security corridors. 

These states are united by a common desire for strategic autonomy. However, they also face the shared challenge of managing their relationships with the major powers without becoming subordinate to them.

Japan would act as a more assertive middle power, pursuing diplomacy that is not bound by the US or the region after Takaichi. 

Her refusal to end Russian LNG imports demonstrates her willingness to defy Washington when necessary, and her plans for increased defence spending suggest that she intends to play a broader security role. 

Agreements with Trump on critical minerals demonstrate efforts to reshape economic dependencies through diversification in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Japan’s choices align with a global shift among middle powers towards multi-vector diplomacy, driven by Trump’s transactional approach, China’s growing assertiveness and the lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Takaichi's Japan is therefore emerging at a time when the geopolitical patterns of the 20th century are dissolving and new configurations are emerging. 

What is happening in Tokyo is part of a wider realignment among middle powers and is not an isolated event. 

Türkiye is at the heart of Eurasia. Japan, on the other hand, is located on the edge of the Pacific. However, the strategic corridors connecting these two regions, from Central Asian energy routes to maritime trade lanes, are becoming increasingly important. 

In the coming decade, those middle-powers that cooperate across these corridors will have an outsized strategic complementarity and influence.

In this wider context, Takaichi's Japan is creating new opportunities and fields of engagement for Ankara. 

As Türkiye pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing relations with NATO, Russia, the Gulf, and Asia, Japan emerges as a natural counterpart, as it too seeks to diversify its partnerships. 

This convergence paves the way for a deeper strategic relationship.