Is RSF’s strategy in Al Fasher about power projection?

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advanced last week to Sudan’s Al Fasher after an 18-month siege that trapped tens of thousands of civilians in the capital of the Darfur region.

At least 2,000 civilians were killed following the city’s fall to Dagalo’s forces, according to the Sudanese government. The RSF now controls all major urban centres in Darfur. 

Since 2023, Dagalo, known as Hemedti, has challenged General Abdel Fattah al Burhan’s leadership, resulting in a bloody civil war between the RSF and the Sudanese army that has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced more than 15 million.

According to humanitarian groups, testimonies from people who fled Al Fasher and statements from the Sudanese government, the RSF has been accused of committing grave abuses, including executing civilians, raping women, and trapping thousands of people inside the city.

In response to the RSF’s actions, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor warned that the Sudanese paramilitary group’s conduct in Al Fasher “may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

The Sudanese government has urged the international community “to act immediately” to stop what it called the RSF’s “genocide.”

“The paramilitary forces’ recent massacres, especially in Al Fasher, are not random acts of brutality but a deliberate strategy aimed at consolidating territorial control and asserting dominance through fear,” says Kaan Devecioglu, an analyst specialising in North and East Africa Studies at ORSAM, a research centre based in Ankara.

The RSF, which evolved from the government-backed Janjaweed militia during the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s, now faces new allegations of war crimes.

Since the outbreak of fighting between the RSF and the Sudanese army, “the RSF has systematically targeted non-Arab communities in Darfur to depopulate resistance areas, destroy local governance, and secure access to resources and supply routes,” Devecioglu tells TRT World.

A strategy of fear, territorial control

In recent months, the Sudanese army has reported significant gains across the country, including in the capital Khartoum, declaring in May that it had “fully cleared” the city of forces loyal to Dagalo.

However, the RSF’s recent capture of Al Fasher and its advances across the Kordofan region, a strategic area linking Sudan’s Darfur provinces to Khartoum, suggest that Dagalo’s forces are far from defeated, Devecioglu says.

The RSF has captured Al Fasher and advances across the Kordofan region, a strategic area linking Sudan’s Darfur provinces to Khartoum.

“By committing atrocities, the RSF sends both a deterrent message to local communities perceived as pro-army and a political signal to international mediators that any future settlement must recognise its coercive power on the ground. These massacres thus function as part of a broader military-political logic rather than isolated criminal acts,” Devecioglu tells TRT World.

The RSF’s loose and ethnically mobilised structure has long fostered localised warlordism and the use of mass violence as a tool of control, analysts say.

“The RSF command and control structure is not capable of ensuring any professionalism during conduct of war, especially in regard to civilians,” says Jihad Masmahoun, an analyst on Sudan and the Horn of Africa.

The United Nations says verified videos show “dozens of unarmed men being shot or lying dead, surrounded by RSF fighters.”

Last month, a report released by Yale University’s Conflict Observatory described Al Fasher as undergoing a “systematic and deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing” targeting the Fur, Zaghawa and Berti, indigenous non-Arab communities, through forced displacement and summary executions.

Analysts also documented what appeared to be “door-to-door clearance operations,” with fighters moving house to house and carrying out widespread violence.

Shifting frontlines

After Burhan’s forces expelled the RSF from central Sudan, the army shifted its focus to securing the country’s centre, north and east, while delegating the fighting in Darfur to allied armed groups, Masmahoun says.

Sudan's humanitarian crisis got worse as the conflict between the RSF and the central Sudanese Armed Forces have continued to rage since 2023.

This division of responsibilities created tensions and coordination problems within Burhan’s government, leading many to believe that delays in lifting the siege on Al Fasher ultimately paved the way for the city’s fall to the RSF, he added.

Meanwhile, the RSF has maintained mobility and local alliances in peripheral regions, enabling it to target civilian areas amid recent escalations. Its use of indiscriminate violence, analysts say, is aimed at preserving its bargaining power and political relevance.

The Sudanese army’s setbacks, the RSF’s recent gains and the continuing killings suggest that the conflict is heading toward a prolonged stalemate rather than a decisive victory, as neither side has the capacity to secure total control amid the limited engagement of regional and international actors, Devecioglu says.

Al Fasher’s capture deepens the country’s geographic divide, with the RSF now controlling western Sudan and much of neighbouring Kordofan. At the same time, the army retains the capital Khartoum, along with central and eastern areas stretching to the Red Sea.

Over the medium term, international fatigue and humanitarian collapse may pressure both sides into negotiations, possibly under a hybrid framework involving regional actors such as Egypt, the UAE and Türkiye, Devecioglu says.

“The future of Sudan, therefore, hinges less on military victory and more on whether the state can be reconstructed around a legitimate, civilian-led political order capable of transcending the warlord economy now taking hold.”