Sabena SiddiquiMarking an elevation of their long-standing military ties, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have recently signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), pledging that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.”
As a senior Saudi official explained to Reuters, this is less a sudden pivot than the culmination of “years of discussions”; not aimed at any one country or event, but rather the “institutionalisation” of the historic and strategic ties between the two countries that have already existed, now made public due to the inevitability of circumstances.
For decades, Saudi-Pakistani defence ties have included joint army training, annual military exercises, arms production and the regular deployment of Pakistani troops in the Kingdom for security roles. But this time, Riyadh has taken things further, with the SMDA, the Kingdom has effectively stepped under Islamabad’s nuclear umbrella.
The timing is no coincidence. A combustible mix of Middle East instability, diminishing trust in US security guarantees, and the need to consolidate deterrence capabilities amid spiking regional threats has forced Riyadh to finally take the plunge.
The pact with Pakistan had long remained a fallback option, pursued quietly in the background, while Riyadh continued its primary effort to secure a broad mutual defence treaty with Washington.
But the comprehensive defence ties Riyadh wished for did not materialise as the Kingdom kept mulling over the US condition of normalisation of relations with Israel.
The ongoing war on Gaza has reached an advanced stage, making such a deal not only politically toxic but practically impossible. Moreover, US assurances remain limited to arms sales and vague promises. For Riyadh, the message was clear: Washington will sell weapons, but it will not put its security umbrella over the Kingdom.
And now, shifting the strategic calculus even further, the crisis has reached uncomfortably closer to home. Neighbouring Qatar faced a missile attack from Iran on the largest US air base in the region, and then Israel attempted to target Hamas negotiators in Doha earlier this month.
Though an emergency Arab-Islamic summit was held in Doha a week later, no clear response to the infringement of Gulf sovereignty could be reached. Ostensibly, it was at this moment that Riyadh finally decided to opt for the Islamabad agreement to save itself from the rising wave of regional instability.
Saudi Arabia’s nuclear shortcut
The Saudi-Pakistani defence equation is hardly new. Without Saudi support, Pakistan may have never become a nuclear power.
Riyadh’s role in Islamabad’s nuclear programme dates back as far as 1974, when the then-prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto resolved to “eat grass and make the bomb” after losing the other half of the country, East Pakistan [modern day Bangladesh] to Indian designs in 1971.
Guided by his vision of securing Pakistan’s defence for the future, Bhutto approached Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal for support, and Riyadh is believed to have discreetly complied.
Again in 1998, after Pakistan’s nuclear tests triggered international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Islamabad turned again towards the Kingdom for help, and a four-year deferred oil financing facility worth around $3.4 billion was provided to weather the storm.
It is not without reason that former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Faisal once described the Saudi-Pakistani equation as “probably one of the closest relationships in the world between any two countries.”
Regarding a Saudi nuclear programme, Riyadh has long sought to counter Iran’s potential nuclear breakout, and partnering with nuclear Pakistan may be the next best option to increase Saudi clout. On various occasions, high-ranking Saudi officials have also declared they would have to ‘pursue the bomb’ if Iran succeeds.
Meanwhile, the Kingdom does have a civilian nuclear programme; the Saudi nuclear authority was founded in 1977, and the Saudi Atomic Energy Institute was established in 1988. Subsequently, Riyadh signed some Memorandums of Understanding with several countries, and it has surveyed its indigenous uranium deposits.
A mini-NATO in the making?
Currently, there are indications that more countries would like to forge similar mechanisms with Islamabad, though it is still early days. In fact, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar has strongly hinted in this direction.
Likening the SMDA to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Retired Saudi Air Force Brigadier General Faisal al Hamad recently told Al Arabiya television that the agreement “adopts” the same principle as NATO’s Article 5, which declares an attack on one member is an attack on all.
The joint statement from Riyadh and Islamabad does echo that commitment, with both sides pledging to treat an armed strike on either country as an assault on both.
Yet the similarities stop there. NATO is a 32-member alliance with an integrated command structure and formal nuclear-sharing arrangements, including US weapons stationed in Europe. The SMDA, by contrast, is a bilateral pact, far narrower in scope, built on decades of ad hoc security cooperation.
What makes the agreement stand out is Pakistan’s candour. Defence Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif has openly acknowledged the nuclear dimension, noting that the deterrent “will be made available” if needed.
For now, the SMDA is being casually dubbed a ‘mini-NATO’. In reality, it is a bilateral deal, flexible, expandable, and perhaps scalable if others, such as the UAE or Egypt, decide to join. But rather than a single umbrella, the expansion may even take the form of separate, customised ‘strategic defence partnerships.’
Hypothetically, it will all depend on the nature of escalating threats in the region, and Pakistan’s willingness to extend commitments without overstretching and keeping in mind all the odds and intricacies.
All this will cast a shadow on Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir’s upcoming visit to the US for the UN General Assembly.
A meeting with President Donald Trump is expected, and the SMDA will surely come up. Yet it may not be the central topic. The US will want to talk counterterrorism, economic stability, and the China factor. Pakistan, for its part, will want to remind Washington that it remains indispensable to Saudi Arabia, and by extension, to the region’s fragile security order.
At its core, the Saudi-Pakistani defence pact is not just about mutual protection. It is a bet that Riyadh can insulate itself from Iran’s threats, US hesitations, and regional chaos by leaning on the only Muslim nuclear power.
Whether that bet pays off may determine the next chapter of Middle Eastern geopolitics.
