Türkiye and Egypt on Monday launched their first joint naval exercise in 13 years, marking a turning point in bilateral relations between the two regional powers. 

The five-day naval drill in the Eastern Mediterranean between September 22 and 26 comes after years of political estrangement and is widely interpreted as a signal of shifting alliances and the emergence of a new regional balance.

The drill, called Bahr El Sadaka in Arabic — meaning “Friendship Sea” — is officially titled the Türkiye-Egypt Friendship Sea Naval Operations Special Exercise.

Türkiye will participate with the frigates TCG Orucreis and TCG Gediz, the fast attack craft TCG Imbat and TCG Bora, the submarine TCG Gur, and two F-16 fighter jets, according to the Turkish Defence Ministry. 

Experts say that Ankara and Cairo are seeking to reinforce their positions in a volatile Mediterranean environment shaped by contested maritime boundaries, energy competition, and broader geopolitical rivalries.

“The fundamental purpose of the exercise we are conducting in this region is interoperability…to enable military vehicles, ships and aircraft of different origins to carry out joint operations together,” says Kemal Olcar, a military strategist and faculty member at Beykent University.

Türkiye currently ranks first among Middle Eastern militaries and ninth globally, while Egypt too has a formidable naval force. 

Hany Elgamal, a researcher in regional and international affairs in Egypt, interprets this cooperation through a wider geopolitical lens.

“It is a warning to Israel and its allies that there are other avenues through which Egypt and its allies in the region can thwart” their expansionist designs in the region, Elgamal tells TRT World.

He stresses that the Egypt-Türkiye cooperation disturbs Israel, particularly in light of its growing use of Greek-administered Cyprus as a military base.

The joint military drills come amid growing global pressure on Israel to end its genocidal war in Gaza, with the UK, Australia and Canada officially recognising the Palestinian state. 

Regional context

Over a decade ago, Türkiye and Egypt found themselves in sharp disagreement for political reasons.

Beyond security, the rapprochement is also rooted in shared positions on regional conflicts. Both experts highlight the importance of a common stance on Gaza, Syria, and energy security. 

Olcar recalls that Ankara and Cairo reached a consensus on the need for a ceasefire in Gaza and the provision of humanitarian aid, describing Israel’s actions as amounting to genocide. 

He adds that the two countries agreed to support Syria’s territorial integrity and stability. 

Elgamal, meanwhile, emphasises that Cairo and Ankara are aligned in preventing Syria from becoming a staging ground for sectarian fragmentation in the Middle East.

The military dimension, however, remains central. Olcar insists that the naval exercise should not be viewed as a temporary tactical manoeuvre but rather as part of a long-term strategic alignment. 

“The 17 memoranda of understanding (MoUs) signed last year…will provide significant support for a number of activities such as high-level strategic cooperation efforts. It does not seem very temporary in this sense,” he says. 

He also suggests expanding the scope of such exercises to include Mediterranean countries like Spain and Italy, whose governments have expressed critical views of Israel’s atrocities in Gaza, thereby broadening the emerging bloc.

Elgamal, on the other hand, underscores the economic and technological aspects. 

He points to a memorandum of understanding signed in Cairo in March between the Arab Organization for Industrialization and Turkish defence company Havelsan, which paves the way for joint drone production in Egypt. 

“It is a step that will lead to the localisation of drone technology at the Qadir factory, one of the most important military factories in Egypt, putting Egypt on the global drone production map,” he explains. 

In his view, this kind of cooperation underlines that Cairo seeks not only immediate security gains but also long-term industrial benefits from its rapprochement with Türkiye.

The joint drills with the powerful Turkish navy also boost the profile and capacity of the Egyptian military, which recently conducted its Bright Star exercise with the United States. 

Elgamal points to President Abdel Fattah el Sisi’s efforts to forge partnerships with regional powers such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. 

“The existence of these regional alliances contributes to putting pressure on the US and Israel to curb their ambitions in the Abraham Accords or the ‘Greater Israel’ plan that comes at the expense of Arab countries,” he says, adding that the cooperation also strengthens the case for a Palestinian state created as per the 1967 borders.

For both Ankara and Cairo, the Eastern Mediterranean has become the focal point of their strategic convergence.

Olcar stresses that Türkiye’s agreement with Libya on the maritime boundary, coupled with its broader Blue Homeland doctrine, disrupted what he describes as a fragile but hostile coalition of Greece, Israel, and the Greek Cypriot Administration. 

“It has isolated Israel and Greece within the region,” he argues, underscoring that the new cooperation with Egypt further undermines that bloc. 

Both Olcar and Elgamal agree that this shift reflects not just a recalibration of bilateral ties but a wider regional realignment, where cooperation between Türkiye and Egypt could reshape the balance of power against Greece, Israel, and their allies.

For Cairo, it opens the door to new defence technologies, expanded trade, and a strengthened regional profile. 

Both capitals see their rapprochement not only as a way to counter external pressure but also as an opportunity to carve out a more autonomous role in a region long shaped by outside powers.