Tricolour flag dem lower for military bases and dem tell ambassadors wey no dey wanted make dem comot from the country. Mining contracts dem rewrite in the name of sovereignty, like we see when dem take over Mali gold. But one last chain still dey wey dem gats break — e no too show but na the strongest: the monetary chain.

By end 2025, West Africa dey go through something like second independence. But this major turning point still depend on whether the countries wey dey involved fit build solid and credible monetary institutions wey go fit make both their people and their partners trust dem.

Alliance of Sahel States (AES), wey new mining power don strengthen, dey prepare to give the final blow to the CFA franc. This kain plan wey dem don calculate, cost and say no go reverse na something wey pass wetin activists dey wish for.

The decision Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey make to move towards one common currency mark di end of an eighty-year historical anomaly. E close the chapter of ‘voluntary servitude’ and open the chapter of ‘total responsibility’.

For the first time, currency no go dey tool to give stability only to foreign investors again; e go become instrument to push local (endogenous) development.

A detailed autopsy of a rentier system

To sabi how sharp this break be, we gats face the accounting truth about the CFA franc. This system wey dem create in 1945 force the centralisation of African foreign exchange reserves into the French Treasury. The way this ‘mandatory deposit’ change over time dey show the story of ongoing tutelage.

This mechanism force African states to deposit 100% of their reserves at the start, then 65% from 1973, and finally e settle for 50% since the 2005 agreements. For short, half of the liquid wealth of some of the poorest countries dey used to finance the public debt of a European power.

People wey defend this system talk say e be guarantee for stability and external credibility, but this ‘stability’ many times come with very small room for manoeuvre for Sahelian economies.

These billions of euros wey dey sleep for operating accounts for Paris don deny the Sahel important liquidity wey e for use for investments.

Even worse, the fixed parity with the euro act like economic shackle. E make African exports too expensive and make European imports dey competitive. This system con early kill any try for local industrialisation, turn the region to big market wey full of imported manufactured goods.

The monetary transition in the Sahel

The final psychological trigger no come from textbook for economics, but from wetin happen for ground for a specific time. The sanctions ECOWAS and UEMOA impose on 9 January 2022 against Mali serve like serious wake-up call for Sahelian leaders.

The way dem shut borders and freeze Malian assets for the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) show one terrible truth: the regional banking system fit cut connection from far to choke government wey them see as too sovereignist. Political sovereignty wey no get monetary sovereignty na only tragic illusion.

From that time, to comot for the CFA don become matter of national security. As long as the alternatives wey dem dey consider no go repeat dependencies and weaknesses wey we dey criticise today in another form.

This one no be economic debate again but matter of state survival. AES understand say dem no fit leave the key to their safe for pocket of institutions wey dey vulnerable to external political pressure.

Sahel gold and the technical challenge

Many sceptics dey ask wetin the new currency fit guarantee. The answer dey under the soil of the region, wey now dey under national control. Loulo gold, Arlit uranium and Agadem oil be some of the strongest collateral for the world.

But the mere presence of these resources no automatically guarantee monetary success: everything go depend on transparency for how dem manage dem and the ability to stop small elite from capture them.

Unlike the CFA franc wey back by political promise from the French Treasury, the AES currency go back by real tangible wealth. Still, this transition get heavy technical challenges wey no wise to ignore. To create new central bank, dem need absolute rigour to avoid the danger of hyperinflation.

The experience of other African countries wey face hyperinflation remind us say monetary sovereignty, if dem mismanage am, fit turn to cause of social and political instability.

Money supply management must dey overseen by competent technocrats wey fit resist temptation to print easy money. The credibility of the future currency, the ‘Sahel’, go depend on whether states fit keep strict budget discipline without Paris arbitration.

Escaping the Eco trap

The Sahel Alliance show strategy sense by turning away from the ‘Eco’ project. This ECOWAS single currency project wey dem don postpone many times still hold a rigid parity and dey tied to Western monetarist ideas. E too resemble ‘CFA bis’ to be real break from the past.

AES dey propose different monetary philosophy wey focus on flexibility. The future currency go allow finance for deficits wey necessary to build critical infrastructure. E go also allow exchange rate adjustment to protect local farmers from dumping of subsidised imported goods.

But this flexibility need clear rules and institutional safeguards to stop opportunistic devaluations and loss of public confidence. The aim no be to reach 2% inflation like eurozone when our youths need jobs.

The goal na to give credit to the real economy. The challenge go be to balance financing productive investment and price stability, without relying on arbitration of external central bank. Today, Malian entrepreneurs dey borrow at high rates, often over 10%, because monetary policy dey model for European needs. The new currency must break this glass ceiling.

A region of 72 million people

The new currency go be glue wey bind the AES confederation together. E go make direct trade between Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey easy without costly conversions. An internal market of about 72 million consumers dey form, united by common political vision and soon by a single currency.

Joint infrastructure projects like refineries and solar power plants go fit be financed with this sovereign currency. But whether dem go implement these projects depend on how fast the three capitals fit set up modern, reliable and interconnected banking clearing system.

This one go reduce exchange rate risk and dependence on dollar loans. Money wey dem create for the Sahel go remain for the Sahel to circulate and create value there. E mean the end of the counter-economy model. Currency go become tool to keep local wealth and do intelligent protectionism.

The nightmare of Françafrique and realism

This prospect dey cause cold sweat for Paris, wey dey see one big lever of influence dey crumbles. The end of the CFA franc for AES zone mean loss of captive market for French companies. For short term, some European firms fit try adapt by renegotiating partnerships on more equal terms.

Alarmist talk about risk of devaluation don already start for media. Even though short-term volatility risk real, these analyses many times forget say Mauritania and Ghana don manage their own currencies for decades. Sovereignty get risk wey people for Sahel dey ready to take.

Fear dey used to paralise African boldness, but blackmail no dey work again. At the same time, AES leaders go need show through real economic and social results say this boldness dey bring better life. Dem dey bet say the cost of perpetual servitude go cost future generations plenty pass.

The dawn of total sovereignty

The birth of the AES currency go be official death knell for Françafrique — if the currency no remain only symbol but become instrument wey responsible, transparent institutions control and dem accountable to citizens. E go complete the three parts of sovereignty: defence, diplomacy and economy.

Assimi Goïta, Ibrahim Traoré and Abdourahamane Tiani dey lay foundations for renewed civilisation, beyond mere political transition. This process go complex and require technical vigilance all the time.

There go be turbulence and speculative attacks against the new currency. How the AES states go respond together to these shocks go decide whether social frustrations go fit turn against the project itself.

In few years, CFA franc banknotes fit turn to museum relics. Dem go testify to one time when Africa pay for the right to be poor. If the Liptako-Gourma states fit shoulder this cost and build strong internal solidarity mechanisms, this combat currency fit become sustainable lever for transformation.

The combat currency dey ready to feed the children of Liptako-Gourma instead of international finance.

The author, Göktuğ Çalışkan is a PhD candidate & International Relations specialist.

Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT Afrika.